

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ ~~TOP SECRET~~  
☐ ~~SECRET~~  
☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
☐ ~~UNCLAS E F T O~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 9/22/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (52A-106049)  
 FROM: SAC, WFO (52A-18088) (P) (C-3)  
 "FACTFIND"  
 MAJOR CASE #48  
 TGP  
 (OO:WFO)

Re WFO airtel to Bureau, dated 9/20/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies each  
 of the following listed FD-302's concerning captioned case:

1. [redacted] on 9/6/83.
2. [redacted] on 8/1/83.
3. [redacted] on 8/8/83.
4. [redacted] on 8/20/83.
5. [redacted] on 9/12/83.
6. Lowell Bruce Laingen on 9/13/83.
7. [redacted] on 9/7/83.
8. [redacted] on 9/14/83.
9. Congressman Dick Cheney on 9/12/83.
10. [redacted] on 9/13/83.
11. [redacted] on 9/13/83 (Reinterview).
12. [redacted] on 8/31/83.

Investigation continuing at WFO.

DE-118

52-106049-273

21 SEP 26 1983

- ③ - Bureau (Enclosures 60)  
 2 - WFO (52A-18088)

ENCLOSURE

48 ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

(5)

100 of Airtel + 4 copies  
 sent of FD-302s to WCCS.

Approved: [redacted]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

55 NOV 7 1983

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[ ] advised he knows William Casey, Director of the CIA, professionally and has worked with him since February, 1981. He claims he and Casey are close friends.

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[ ] advised he initiated the call to Mr. Casey in July, 1983, to report what [ ] had related to him concerning [ ] involvement in the preparation of the Carter debate papers. He claims he first called [ ] Assistant to President Reagan, and told him briefly about the [ ] conversation. [ ] told him to call Casey direct. He claims he would have called him anyway, but felt that he owed it to [ ] to talk to him first. He called Casey because he was personally close to him. He told him what [ ] had related regarding [ ]. He advised he told both Casey and [ ] that he felt that there had been a violation of the Hatch Act in that [ ] a Government employee, had been involved doing political work for the Carter administration. He indicated to them that [ ] had typed the debate papers during her normal work day.

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[ ] advised he has had no other discussions with Casey or anyone else about the [ ] and [ ] conversation.

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[ ] was of the opinion that [ ] currently resides in the Washington, D.C., area. After leaving the White House Staff, she went into private industry, perhaps with a law firm.

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[ ] claims he mentioned [ ] name to Mr. Casey because he honestly believed that the CIA was innocent of any involvement concerning the Carter debate papers. He was a close friend to Casey and he believed Mr. Casey when he said that the CIA was not involved. He claims Casey looked him in the eye and told him that the CIA was not involved.

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[ ] advised he will resume employment with the Boeing Aircraft Corporation at Kent, Washington, as a Government Affairs Manager. He and his wife, [ ] will maintain their residence at Sumner, Washington. He described himself as a white male, born [ ]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/14/83

Date of transcription

[redacted]  
voluntarily appeared at the Dayton, Ohio Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent, the nature of the inquiry, and furnished the following information:

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V.A.

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male white  
[redacted]

He has just returned to the Dayton area after having appeared on August 29, and 30, 1983, before the Albosta Committee, House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Government Affairs, Postal Service and Human Resources, concerning any knowledge he may have had regarding allegations that members of the Reagan - Bush campaign staff may have had possession of certain documents originated by then President Carter's administration. During his appearance he was exhibited numerous documents, some of which he identified as being similar to documents he recalled copying while employed at the Reagan - Bush campaign headquarters.

His first experience as a campaign worker occurred during Ronald Reagan's unsuccessful presidential bid during 1976. He was a local volunteer worker at the time. His interest in politics was also heightened as a result of his friendship with Ohio State Senator Donald Lukens of Middletown, Ohio. Senator Lukens has been both a close personal and family friend. As best as he could recall, sometime during June, 1980, he received a call from Senator Lukens advising him that if he [redacted] could pay his way to Washington, D.C. he could probably get a job at the Reagan - Bush campaign headquarters. As a result he did travel to Washington, D.C. where he did secure a job at the campaign headquarters located in Arlington, Virginia. For approximately the first month, his immediate supervisor was [redacted] who was the Director of Administration for the Reagan - Bush campaign. He worked on the fourth floor at the headquarters. This floor housed the executive suites, the press office and the finance committee. After approximately one month, due to financial restraints, he was transferred from the above section to the press office where he was given title of Press Assistant. However, his boss was still [redacted] and his job remained the same.

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Investigation on 9/6/83 at Dayton, Ohio File # CI 52A-5928  
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/9/83

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His position at headquarters during his entire tenure there, was that of Principal Operator of the Kodak Ektaprint Copying Machine located on the fourth floor. He also performed routine maintenance on other desk top copiers located throughout the building. He estimated that he worked an average of 14 to 16 hours per day, 6 to 7 days a week copying material for the committee. He stated that at the height of the campaign during a 10 day period, he produced over 1 million copies on this machine. To the best of his knowledge, no one else ran this machine to any great extent. There was another individual, [REDACTED] who also worked for [REDACTED] and served basically as a "go-fer" for senior staff members, and may have helped him on a project or two. However, [REDACTED] would not have operated the Kodak machine alone. As best as he could recall [REDACTED] was no longer doing any photo copying when the Carter material was alleged to have been copied, which was prior to the Carter - Reagan debate on October 28, 1980. He recalled that on a few occasions, some staff workers from the press office would request him to leave the Kodak machine on when he was leaving for the day. It was his impression that since the Washington papers were delivered late in the evening, the press office needed the machine to copy articles and statements appearing in the paper which were needed the next day for senior staff members. The Kodak machine was always in demand since it provided original like quality copies.

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He stated that in his estimation 30% to 40% of the documents he copied were press releases to be sent out to the numerous media representatives. The bulk of the material copied was assorted campaign material, such as staff correspondence, briefing books (not President Carter's), issue booklets, and assorted internal campaign documents. His job was to copy documents, not review them. However, on occasions he did review some documents, especially those which needed several hundred copies made, such as an internal directory, which was published at least weekly. The normal procedure to be followed if a document needed to be copied would be for someone from within the department needing the document copied, usually a low level staff employee, to bring the document to his desk where a pre-printed form would be attached stating the number of copies desired, the department requesting the copies, and the individual requesting or authorizing the copies. The document would then be placed in a large in basket. He would simply take a document from the basket, check the copies needed, set the machine and make the required number of copies. He would then place the finished document and copies in another basket. At some point in time, either the individual who brought the document to his office or someone else from that department would stop back to retrieve the document. On rare occasions he handled requests directly from several senior staff members. On those occasions,

Continuation of interview of [REDACTED]

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the senior staff person usually had a few items that needed copying immediately and that individual would wait while he made the required copies. The senior staff persons that he dealt with directly were [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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He remained at campaign headquarters until approximately November 6 or 7, 1980. At that time the headquarters was dismantled and everyone moved on to the next phase, which for him was working on the Inaugural Committee. He was the Director of Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC) Printing Office. He could not recall the exact address or location, however, the committee worked out of a surplus military building located in the southwestern section of Washington. He later worked as [REDACTED] however, for official pay records he was listed as a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He remained at this position until approximately January or February, 1982. He left that position to take a job at the U.S. Department of Education, where he remained until approximately August, 1982. He left that position to return to school.

During his tenure at campaign headquarters he was not aware of any material or document that he saw and/or copied as having originated from within the Carter campaign headquarters. After being interviewed by the Albosta Committee it appeared to him that possibly some documents which he copied at campaign headquarters were in fact documents which emanated from the Carter campaign. He stressed that at the time he was copying the documents, he had no knowledge as to their origin. He recalled that there were several documents in particular that he recalled copying which in his opinion were "not in synch" with the vast quantity of other documents he was copying for staff at headquarters. When asked to expand on the description that these documents were again "not in synch" [REDACTED] commented that he meant the form for these documents was noticeable different from the usual campaign committee material and they appeared to have a "democratic flavor". He recalled three separate occasions where he copied documents of this type. In each instance the documents came from the office of [REDACTED]

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Continuation of interview of \_\_\_\_\_

Page 4

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The first instance occurred sometime during late September, 1980, or early October, 1980. At the time, \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ who was \_\_\_\_\_ and a \_\_\_\_\_ came to him with a document to copy. She advised him that she needed the document copied immediately. At the time he was working on a priority project for \_\_\_\_\_. He advised \_\_\_\_\_ that he was working on a priority project and he would copy the document for her as soon as possible. \_\_\_\_\_ became upset but left the document on his desk. When he began to copy the document he noticed that it was incomplete, that is the document did not have a cover sheet or an introduction. Since \_\_\_\_\_ was not waiting on the document, he glanced through it as he copied it. He recalled that the document appeared to discuss domestic related subjects with a definite "democratic flavor". He only made a few copies of the document for \_\_\_\_\_. He recalled that this document was not an original document since it did not have the original three ring binder holes, but rather showed where the holes were. The document contained approximately 20 to 40 pages. After he copied the document, he placed it in the finished bin where it was subsequently picked up by \_\_\_\_\_. He estimated that \_\_\_\_\_ returned for the document within 15 to 20 minutes.

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On two later occasions, he received similar documents from another individual he believed was a \_\_\_\_\_ who was also a \_\_\_\_\_. The first time \_\_\_\_\_ was alone. On the second occasion she was with \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ was on the fourth floor apparently for a meeting and \_\_\_\_\_ had accompanied him. \_\_\_\_\_ came by his desk without \_\_\_\_\_. On both occasions since he was not very busy, he copied the documents for \_\_\_\_\_ immediately while she waited. As a result, he did not have the opportunity to examine or review these documents as closely as the documents copied for \_\_\_\_\_. However, again mainly comparing format, the \_\_\_\_\_ documents were similar to the documents brought by \_\_\_\_\_. Also, both documents were incomplete, containing between 20 to 40 pages, not original and written with "a democratic flavor".

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He also recalled two other documents that he copied which were unusual and "out of synch", with the documents he was used to copying. However, these documents did not have a "democratic flavor" and in his estimation could have been legitimate documents prepared for the Reagan - Bush committee. He recalled these two documents because both were classified as being "Confidential", which was highly unusual. He could not recall having copied any other classified documents. These documents were deposited in his in basket on separate occasions. He could not recall the number of copies made nor who requested copies. The first document was marked in "Confidential Document

Continuation of Interview of [REDACTED]

Page 5

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Number 3", and discussed the Iranian hostage situation. To the best of his recollection, the document was approximately 15 to 20 pages long. The second document was marked, "Confidential Document Number 5", and again discussed the Iranian hostage situation. He recalled that according to the cover pages on both documents, each was written by a [REDACTED] who was with the Power Negotiation Institute, located in North Brook, Illinois. He also recalled that [REDACTED] was described on the cover pages as being a consultant to the FBI and/or CIA. He recalled making the requested number of copies and placing the finished copies in the out basket where they were subsequently picked up. He could not identify whoever picked up these documents. He reiterated that the only reason he remembered the above two documents was mainly because of them being classified.

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[REDACTED] categorical stated that he was not aware during any point of his employment of a concerted effort or plan by anyone at the Reagan - Bush campaign headquarters to obtain any Carter campaign material. He did note that there was a legitimate department within the camp whose sole purpose and goal was to review, analysis and copy any and all speeches made by Carter which appeared in print or on television or radio.

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[REDACTED] advised that the copying machine which he operated and was responsible for on the fourth floor was a Kodak Ektaprint Copier. There was a similar but smaller version of this copier on the third floor. Since he also performed routine maintenance on all other copiers in the building, he estimated that there were three to four Sharp Desk Top Copiers also in the building.

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[REDACTED] then thoroughly reviewed the seven pages of facsimile documents which were a part of documents released by the White House and taken from the files of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. He stated that to the best of his recollection he has never seen these documents before nor has he copied these documents for anyone while employed at the Reagan - Bush campaign headquarters.

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The following information was obtained by observation and interview:

Name:  
Sex:  
Race:  
Date of birth

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of interview of

Page 6 \*

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Place of birth:  
Residence

Telephone #

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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/2/83

[redacted] Spencer-Roberts and Associates, Inc., 17692 Cowan Street, Irvine, California, 92714,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] has been involved in running political campaigns since 1960. He ran the Reagan campaign for Governor in 1970 and ran the Gerald R. Ford campaign for President of the United States in 1976.

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He was employed by the Reagan campaign of 1980 from near the first of July 1980 until election day in November of 1980. During that period of time his principal responsibilities had to do with the mechanics of the campaign to which he referred to the arranging of transportation, lodging, people to meet, itineraries, etc.

In addition to this, he also gave counsel in relation to political decisions. He made an example of the fact that he had been involved in the discussion as to whether or not Reagan should participate in debates with Carter; however, he was not heavily involved in the debate planning. He did attend a few debate practices that Reagan did participate in.

He advised that he had never heard of a document entitled, "Carter Briefing Book," or anything of a similar name.

[redacted] was shown a document which was entitled, "Memo from [redacted] to [redacted] After reviewing the document and its attached typed document entitled, "Proposed Carter Tactics for Debate and Campaign Advertising," [redacted] advised that he did not specifically recall this document and that it was neither significant nor memorable. He advised that the reference to a reliable source with intimate connections to the Carter Debate Staffer, does not mean anything to him. The typed document containing Carter tactics was not particularly thorough nor would any of it been in any way surprising. It is surprising, though, that there seems to be an omission in the list of ten different items to any reference to Social Security which was a big issue in Carter's campaign as well as anticipated by the Reagan staff.

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He was shown various other documents, many of which

Investigation on 8/1/83 at Irvine, California File # LA 52A-20707-31

by SA [redacted]

Date dictated 8/2/83b6  
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refer to source's providing itinerary type information. He advised this type of information was generally accessible through various members of the news media. They were always the first to know the itinerary of the opposition candidates and generally provided the same itinerary information regarding their candidate to the opposition. Neither was considered to be of any major consequence, although was considered valuable information.

He advised that sources within the Carter campaign staff or from the White House who were, or could have been, providing information to the Reagan campaign would either generally fall into one of two groups. One group would be ideological idealists who would be backing a particular candidate because of his political ideology. Another group would be those individuals who are embittered, unhappy employees.

He advised that he specifically did not know any individual who was identified or could have been identified as a "reliable" source.

He added that it is common in campaigns where an individual would boast as to the great value and sensitivity of his particular source of information. This would be used as a means to become a member of an in-group in the campaign planning sessions. The quality of the information would, in fact, be exaggerated based upon the closeness that the source has to the information.

He pointed out that Washington, D.C. is a very, very, small community and although people may be ideologically opposed to one another, they can still become close friends and provide information back and forth.

He advised that the reference on a few documents that were shown to him referring to Deputies Meetings he clarified as follows:

[redacted] had appointed nine different Deputies involved in planning the Reagan campaign. They would have weekly meetings, at which point they would discuss a variety of campaign problems or successes, etc. He advised that in September he had, in fact, attended two of these Deputy Meetings for one of the Deputies who was absent. He described these discussions and problems as being a very cumbersome way to run a campaign and

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LA 52A-20707

not a good use of time or energy.

He concluded that during the twenty odd years that he had been involved in political campaigns that he has received information from the opposition through a variety of means. Generally the source of the information was never known to him, but he used the information if it turned out to have merit. To his knowledge there was never anything illegal involved in using information that was received and never had he ever participated in or been aware that any information was obtained through anything but legal means. He provided no additional information of value.

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

8/10/83

Date of transcription

[redacted] Public Affairs Counseling,  
209 Avenida Del Mar, Suite 203, San Clemente, California,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

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From mid 1979 until mid 1980, exact dates unrecalled, [redacted] had acted as consultant to the Reagan for President Campaign Committee. From September 29, 1980 until the election day, November 4, 1980, he had worked as [redacted] for Candidate Ronald Reagan. As [redacted] he travelled with Candidate Reagan traveling principally by airplane and being a different city and state nearly daily. He was very seldom in the Operations Office located in Virginia. [redacted] was the Boss at the Operations Office and information, statistics and data that might be incorporated [redacted] was set out by a telecopier from the Operations Office where it would be received by [redacted] and he would decide whether to incorporate any of the information received from the Operations Office in [redacted]. Generally he advised that the information was not of any significant value.

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[redacted] was shown a copy of a document entitled "Memorandum for the Cabinet" dated October 24, 1980. Upon reviewing this document briefly, [redacted] advised that he had never seen this document before. He added that in late October they had been eagerly awaiting the results of the latest Consumer Price Index (CPI), which came out on the fourth Friday of every month. October 24, 1980, being the fourth Friday, the information from the CPI had been released earlier that morning to the media and was available to everyone. It was also of significance because of the sharp rise in the CPI, which was therefore a boon to the Reagan Campaign coming so shortly before the election.

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[redacted] indicated that he would have had [redacted] prepared for Reagan in anticipation of the publishing of the CPI rate. There would have probably, he indicated, been two [redacted] one on the condition that the CPI was up significantly and another had the price either remained the same or gone down. He then caused a check of [redacted] of which he had drafts in his office and located [redacted] that he had prepared for Candidate Ronald Reagan on October 24, 1980. [redacted] has

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Investigation on 8/8/83 at San Clemente, California File # LA 52A-20707 3-1  
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 8/9/83

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one reference to the CPI

A review of [ ] showed to him that [ ]  
[ ] for the candidate, had written this particular  
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[ ] was questioned about the report that [ ]  
was present in the office of [ ] along with [ ]  
[ ] when [ ] was reported to have said, "We just got  
some figures on the Consumer Price Index and we must change [ ]  
[ ] quickly. We must put this information into [ ] b6  
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[ ] advised that this incident did not take  
place as it would have been an insult to [ ] intellect  
for someone to point out to him something so obvious as incorporating  
the latest CPI rates which were helpful to Candidate Reagan  
[ ] He advised that he can remember at no time  
when he was present with [ ] in [ ] office  
at the Operations Office. b6  
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In reference to the "Memorandum for the Cabinet"  
document dated October 24, 1980, [ ] reviewed the document  
and pointed out that the information contained was not so much  
a reporting of the actual CPI rate, but rather what the official  
line was going to be in the interpretation of the CPI rate increase.  
The "party line" response as set out in this communication was  
quite transparent and would have been exactly what any reasonable  
person would have anticipated the response to be. b6  
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[ ] advised that he had no knowledge nor had  
he ever heard any mention of the existence of any Carter Campaign  
documents or any White House documents, specifically he had never  
heard of any Carter briefing material in preparation for the  
debate. He added that he was not involved in any debate preparation  
as this was done by the [ ] Committee and was completed entirely  
by [ ] staff. b6  
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General Campaign Intelligence Information concerning  
what the other candidate is saying, doing or planning is of little  
consequence in relation to a campaign. He advised that it was his  
information that information which could be considered as intelligence  
information came through the two researchers, [ ] or  
[ ] reported, is presently with the  
White House and [ ] is the Editor of "Inquire" magazine. b6  
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[ ] provided no additional information of  
value.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 9/1/83

[redacted]  
was apprised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, and the purpose of the interview. He thereafter furnished the following information:

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As background, [redacted] stated that he is [redacted] of Power Negotiation, Inc., 633 Skokie Boulevard, Northbrook, Illinois, [redacted]. He also stated that he is a Contract Consultant to both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For the DOJ, he periodically gives seminars on power negotiating to senior departmental attorneys, and for the FBI, he periodically lectures at the Bureau's Executive Development Program and lectures at The National Academy. [redacted] also has been a guest speaker at the National Executives Institute, which has the sponsorship and/or endorsement of the FBI.

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[redacted] has also acted as a consultant to other U.S. government agencies such as the S.E.C., U.S.D.S., Forestry Service, and Bureau of Land Management. He currently is acting as a consultant for the U.S.D.S. for the Strategic Arms Limitations talks with the Soviet Union and in this latter capacity has had recent contact and/or correspondence with Senior State Department Officials to include Secretary of State George Schultz.

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[redacted] stated his work on behalf of the government dates back to 1974, when Edward Levi became Attorney General in the Ford Administration, and invited [redacted] to lecture on his area of expertise to high government officials.

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[redacted] advised that his connection with the Carter Administration was the result of the Iranian Government taking hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979. He was invited, by someone whose identity he does not recall, to become a member of the U.S. Government's Hostage Task Force. In this capacity, [redacted] along with other persons from both the public and private sector, attempted to formulate policy, predictions and projections regarding the U.S. Government position in negotiations with the Iranian Government for the release of the U.S. hostages. As a result of [redacted] involvement

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Investigation on 8/20/83 at Glencoe, Illinois File # CG 52A-8463  
by [redacted] Date dictated 8/26/83

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CG 52A-8463

with the Hostage Task Force, he had personal dealings with [redacted] (phonetic), U.S.D.S., Program Head of Counter-Terrorism, [redacted] a U.S. Ambassador who was [redacted] Superior, [redacted] a senior white house advisor on the staff of President Jimmy Carter, and Admiral [redacted] a member of the National Security Council (NSC) and a principal deputy of [redacted] head of the NSC. [redacted] recalled having contact with other state department officials of lesser rank but he could not recall their identities.

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[redacted] stated that initially, after several task force discussions regarding the hostage situation, he formulated some ideas and was asked to prepare a position paper incorporating these ideas. This report was completed in January, 1980, and was furnished to either the NSC or President Jimmy Carter. He stated that over a five month period he prepared upon request an additional four reports, all dealing with various aspects of the hostage situation and all being channeled to either the NSC or President Carter.

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[redacted] noted that throughout his involvement with both the task force and the above identified individuals he was not given any written briefing material or other information, which obviously would have aided the preparation of his written material. He stated that as the hostage situation developed, several of his predictions proved to be true and his input was thereafter sought on a more frequent basis. He advised that he submitted his last written report in April, 1980, and became disenchanted with the government effort Vis-A-Vis the hostage situation because of the abortive rescue attempt, which he felt was an unnecessary alternative at that time.

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[redacted] advised that in May, 1980 he met with [redacted] per [redacted] request. [redacted] stated that this meeting related exclusively to the hostage situation, and he provided the requested input without benefit of any information from [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that as best he could recall, he was contacted by [redacted] of now Vice President George Bush in July, 1980, while in New York City on business. He stated he met with [redacted] at the Yale Club for lunch, and [redacted] requested [redacted] thoughts regarding the so-called "October Surprise" by the Carter Administration, which the Reagan Campaign feared would be detrimental to Reagan in the

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upcoming presidential election. There was a consensus within the Reagan Campaign that President Carter would manipulate the hostages' release to enhance the potential of his re-election to the presidency. [ ] stated that his discussion with [ ] at this luncheon concerned his thoughts regarding the Carter Administration's general mismanagement of this hostage situation, but his strong advise to [ ] was to not make it a political issue as it would be improper to do so. [ ] advised that [ ] suggested [ ] should go public and speak out regarding the hostage problem, but this was something [ ] categorically refused to do out of his own sense of propriety.

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[ ] advised that he had no contacts with anyone from the Carter Administration in August, 1980. In September, 1980, however, he was invited to the White House with other people for a general audience with President Jimmy Carter. At that meeting, Carter was visibly depressed over the hostage situation.

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In early October, 1980, [ ] stated he was contacted by someone from a "Think Tank," whose identity he could not recall, who asked him if President Carter could get the hostages out in October. [ ] opinion was that Carter would not be able to do so.

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Also in October, [ ] recalled that someone contacted him to arrange a meeting with William Casey, then Presidential Campaign Manager for Ronald Reagan. [ ] stated [ ] may or may not have been the person who arranged this meeting, but he was not absolutely certain. [ ] was in New York City at the time of the contact and Casey flew from Washington, D.C. to meet with [ ] in [ ] room at the Plaza Hotel. [ ] recalled that this meeting began at approximately 9:00 p.m. on a Wednesday and lasted until the early a.m. of the following day. The meeting solely concerned the hostage situation and was strictly an oral presentation by [ ] based on his familiarity with the issue developed over the preceding year. [ ] also stated that he strongly advised Casey not to make it a political issue. Casey requested [ ] to write a report regarding the hostage situation including his recommendations for its resolution. [ ] stated that he immediately started to write his report, and he was scheduled to personally give it to Casey in Washington, D.C. the following Saturday. [ ] was unable to complete the report within that narrow time frame and he returned home, mailing the finished report to Casey on or about October 25, 1980.

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[ ] advised that he met Casey once again on Saturday, November 3, 1980, at Republican Party Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia and Casey indicated to him at that time that he had received the report and was extremely pleased with it. [ ] recalled that a retired military officer was also present during his meeting with Casey, and there was a general discussion concerning the upcoming election.

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[ ] stated that at no time did he have possession of any written or printed material not of his own origin which might be construed as government property. He also advised that none of the persons identified above ever gave him documents or information and he is not responsible for any government property coming into the custody of the Reagan Campaign Committee. His report regarding the hostage situation written for William Casey was taken from his personal recollection, and explicit familiarity with the issue over nearly a year's period of time. He advised that as best he could recall he did not ever discuss with [ ] any domestic issues relevant to the presidential campaign and he did not ever indicate to [ ] that he had highly placed sources on the National Security Council. [ ] advised that his contacts with [ ] were limited and included possibly only two additional phone conversations after their meeting at the Yale Club.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/15/83

Date of transcription

[redacted] House Republican Policy Committee, U. S. House of Representatives, 1620 Longworth Building, Washington, D.C. (WDC), was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose for the interview. [redacted] furnished the following information:

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[redacted] proceeded the interviewing by stating that in July, 1982, he [redacted]

[redacted] He stated that he is aware, from contacts with the press, that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agents are going around town conducting interviews for the press. He stated that [redacted] [redacted] he would not like to see the results of this interview in the press, which would thereby create a stressful situation for him. [redacted] was advised that it was FBI policy that matters under investigation are not divulged during the course of the investigation. It was pointed out, however, that following the conclusion of this investigation, the results of this interview could be subject to disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act or to the Albosta Committee.

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[redacted] stated he was a reporter for the Scripts-Howard Newspapers from [redacted] until [redacted] when he was employed by the Republican National Committee. He was employed in his current position in [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that [redacted] is a longtime friend of his family. The friendship began when [redacted] father, a well-known Wisconsin newspaper columnist, wrote a column defending [redacted] in the 1950's when [redacted] was being investigated by the House Committee on un-American activities. [redacted] stated he contacted [redacted] approximately one week after Easter, 1983 to express appreciation for [redacted] assistance to [redacted] mother when [redacted] was [redacted] [redacted] stated the telephone conversation lasted approximately one and one half hours. During the course of the

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Investigation on 9/12/83 at Washington, D.C. File WFO 52A-18088

by SAS [redacted] Date dictated 9/14/83

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Interview of [REDACTED]

Page 2

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conversation, [REDACTED] stated that he was working for "your guy" meaning Reagan. [REDACTED] went on to say that during the 1980 campaign he provided assistance to Reagan on two occasions. On the first occasion, [REDACTED] related that he provided a speech to [REDACTED] to be used by candidate Reagan. The speech was drafted by [REDACTED] a Kennedy speechwriter, specifically for Reagan. [REDACTED] stated that in the other instance, [REDACTED] indicated he provided [REDACTED] with "materials prepared for [REDACTED] use in preparation for the debate." [REDACTED] stated he does not recall whether [REDACTED] referred to this material as a briefing book or briefing materials. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] stated during the conversation that Reagan had hired a Pennsylvania speech consultant and that [REDACTED] found this strange since Reagan would not appear to require advice on how to present himself to the public. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that this Pennsylvania speech consultant had found the material useful.

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is a longtime associate of the Kennedy family to the extent that he is almost a family member. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] during the telephone conversation that he supported Reagan in the 1980 campaign because Carter had slighted the Kennedy family, especially the Kennedy widows on several occasions. One instance referred to by [REDACTED] during the conversation was an incident in 1978 when Congress had authorized the striking of a special memorial medallion honoring Robert Kennedy and possibly John Kennedy. When the medallion was given to Carter for presentation to the Kennedys, Carter threw it in his desk drawer and no action was taken until Reagan took office in January, 1981. [REDACTED] also noted that one of the first actions taken by Reagan after he took office was to host a very private ceremony where the medallion was presented to Ethel Kennedy. [REDACTED] related to [REDACTED] that he supported Reagan in 1980 for this and other reasons.

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[REDACTED] stated he does not recall any other aspects of the conversation which relate to [REDACTED] association with the 1980 Reagan campaign.

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[ ] stated that [ ] has a reputation with reporters as being a self-promoter and someone who is occasionally less than truthful. [ ] stated, however, that he has never known [ ] to be untruthful with him.

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[ ] stated he related the essence of his conversation with [ ] to Congressman Cheney shortly after it occurred. He again discussed the conversation with Cheney after the publicity concerning the Reagan campaign's possession of Carter debate briefing material.

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[ ] was questioned as to whether he discussed this conversation with anyone other than Cheney, particularly with anyone in the media. [ ] stated he had talked to several reporters, including [ ] and [ ]. He stated, however, that he had been "less than helpful" during contacts with the media. [ ] was advised that interviewing Agents were aware that a newspaper reporter, while researching this matter, has made a reference to a third party, which is almost verbatim to one of [ ]'s recollections with respect to his conversation with [ ]. It was pointed out that [ ] was being made aware of this fact in view of his opening statement at the outset of this interview. [ ] stated he was unaware as to how anyone in the media could have knowledge of his conversation with [ ] unless it was obtained from [ ].

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[ ] was questioned as to whether he believed it was possible that a Kennedy supporter may have given the Carter debate briefing material to the Reagan campaign. [ ] said the possibility exists since many Kennedy sympathizers were employed in the Carter White House. As an example, [ ] advised that the [ ] during the Carter Administration, [ ] who was employed in the Carter White House at a time when [ ] was withdrawn from [ ] under circumstances that were less than amiable. He further stated that he believes there were many other Kennedy sympathizers employed in the Carter White House or the 1980 Carter campaign.

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Interview of [REDACTED]

Page 4

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[REDACTED] stated he has had no contact with [REDACTED] since April, 1983. With respect to [REDACTED] background, he stated that [REDACTED] has always been a political consultant and particularly a political operative for the Kennedy family. He stated he is also involved in many business ventures and he believes [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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9/14/83

Date of transcription

Lowell Bruce Laingen, the Vice President of the National Defense University (NDU), was interviewed at his office in Room 218, Building 59, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C. (WDC). Laingen, a Senior Diplomat on assignment at NDU from the United States Department of State (USDS), provided the following information:

Laingen reviewed, then commented on, a photocopied 26 page document (number 28), which was retrieved among various documents from the Reagan/Bush campaign stored in the Archives of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University in California. The document, which is classified, "Secret-Eyes Only," and dated August 2, 1979, begins with a letter on USDS stationery addressed to the Honorable L. Bruce Laingen, who was then the Charge d'Affaires at the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, from [redacted] who was then [redacted] Office of Iranian Affairs at USDS in WDC and who currently is assigned to the U. S. Embassy [redacted]. Commenting on this cover letter, Laingen pointed out several things. For example, Laingen identified as having been written by him the words, "Show to [redacted] on the upper-right-hand margin of the letter. Laingen identified [redacted] as [redacted] who is a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) at USDS, serving as [redacted] for Indian Affairs. At the time this letter was written, [redacted] was Laingen's [redacted] in Tehran, and Laingen wrote the note on the cover letter to remind himself to show the document to [redacted]. Laingen identified [redacted] mentioned in the body of the letter, as [redacted] who was, at that time, [redacted] for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and who is now the Ambassador to [redacted]. In [redacted] former assignment, he served as Deputy to Assistant Secretary [redacted].

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Laingen recalled receiving the letter and the first four pages attached to it, and that the letter was in response to cables which had been sent, during the last week in July, between the Embassy in Iran and USDS, Washington, concerning the issue of admitting the Shah of Iran to the United States. Because of the sensitivity of that issue, the communications

Investigation on 9/13/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088

by SAS [redacted] Date dictated 9/13/83

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were highly classified, which Laingen said explained [redacted] statement in the first sentence of the cover letter, "I was finally able to see your cable...."

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Laingen also identified two copies of the same cable, dated July 26, 1979, appearing in two places in the pages attached to the August 2, 1979, [redacted] letter, as copies of the cables he received from USDS which triggered an exchange of cables between Laingen and (then) Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The remainder of the document, consisting of pages from The Congressional Record, dated Wednesday, December 5, 1979, and Wednesday, March 26, 1980, was unfamiliar to Laingen. However, the topic of discussion in the copied pages of The Congressional Record was familiar to Laingen because it concerned the November, 1979, trip to Iran of Republican Congressman George Hansen, who came there ostensibly to negotiate with the Iranian students holding Laingen and the staff of the American Embassy hostage.

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The Iranian students who seized the American Embassy in November, 1979, also seized the letter from [redacted] and the USDS cables, including the one from July 26, 1979. As evidence the Iranian students had the August 2, 1979, [redacted] letter in their possession, Laingen pointed out an apparently handwritten set of marks appearing at the upper center of the [redacted] cover letter. Laingen identified these marks as words written in Farsi, the language of Iran. However, Laingen could not translate the words. Laingen was certain the letter and its attachments (at least the first four pages) were taken by the students because the document was among others locked in Laingen's safe when the takeover happened, and within two days, that safe had been opened and its contents removed by the Iranian students.

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Laingen was aware that the Iranian students began using various seized documents for propaganda purposes beginning in February, 1980, and reprinting those and still others in books and pamphlets by mid-year, 1980.

Laingen considered it "quite conceivable" the Iranian students gave the August 2, 1979, [ ] letter and its attachments to the Iranian Press, and may even have given it to Congressman Hansen, who may have, in turn, passed it on to the Reagan/Bush campaign. The latter seemed likely to Laingen because the opinions expressed in the attachment to the [ ] letter, with which opinions Laingen was in complete agreement, were against admitting the Shah at that time. However, the Carter Administration went against these opinions and admitted the Shah to the United States. Therefore, the motive for Congressman Hansen possibly passing on the [ ] and The Congressional Record material to the Reagan/Bush campaign was to provide a potential source of embarrassment for the Carter Administration which had apparently acted in contravention of advice from its highest diplomats, and in doing so, had exacerbated and already politically sensitive situation.

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In actuality, however, Laingen had no idea or knowledge of how this or any other document, which originally was the property of the Carter campaign, came into the possession of the Reagan/Bush campaign. Further, Laingen could not identify the writer of, or attribute any meaning to, the handwritten notation on the bottom of the first page of the August 2, 1979, [ ] letter, which notation begins, [ ] I don't know....," and ends, "...regarding the Shah. [ ]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 9/13/83

[redacted] Attorney, Wilmer Cutler and Pickering Law Firm, 1666 K Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., (WDC), was interviewed and furnished the following information:

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[redacted] advised that he was Counsel to President Carter from October 1, 1979 through December, 1980. Prior to that, he was the President's Representative to the Senate Arms Control Committee concerning the Salt II Treaty. Concerning [redacted] work with [redacted] re-election campaign, he advised that he oversaw that the incumbent's campaign and workers did not violate any of the regulations of the Hatch Act.

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[redacted] was shown a document entitled "Presidential Debates, Foreign Policy and National Security Issues," which was prepared by [redacted] and [redacted] in preparation for a Carter/Reagan Presidential Debate. [redacted] advised that he did not specifically recall seeing these documents in this particular form. He stated that he recalled seeing drafts concerning such issues as the MX Missiles, Arms Control and the Afghanistan situation. He stated that he received these drafts from either [redacted]

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[redacted] stated he would review the drafts, comment on them, and make any additions and return them to [redacted] or [redacted]. [redacted] indicated that he did not recall receiving a compilation of all the issues in one document but rather, received drafts of the various issues in a piecemeal nature. [redacted] further added that the drafts that he saw would not have been handwritten but in a typed version.

[redacted] was shown a memorandum dated October 7, 1980, from [redacted] to the President, which stated "Attached is the Foreign Policy and National Security Book, which was prepared for the debates..." This memo in the copy count contained [redacted] name penciled in. [redacted] stated that he did not recall the memo nor did he recall reviewing the so called debate briefing book. He stated that it was possible that [redacted] or [redacted] or a member of their staff, may have handed him a copy of this book and, after doing so, penciled in his name in the copy count. He stated that this was just speculation on his part and he could not specifically recall receiving the book.

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
Investigation on 9/7/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088

by SAs [redacted]Date dictated 9/9/83b6  
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[REDACTED] was asked who on his staff would have had access to the drafts that he alluded to along with any sensitive material or material relating to the Presidential Debates. [REDACTED] furnished the names of his two deputies, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] along with his assistant, [REDACTED] who worked with [REDACTED] on the Salt II Treaty negotiations. He added that his personal secretary, [REDACTED] would have had access to those types of documents also. [REDACTED] added that these were all strong Carter supporters and doubted very much that any of those individuals would have been involved in leaking information from the Carter campaign to the Reagan campaign. [REDACTED] further added that he was not aware of any moles in the Carter Administration who would have furnished campaign information to the Reagan/Bush campaign. [REDACTED] added that he thought the [REDACTED] National Security Council area had the most people aware of and handling the briefing book concerning the Foreign Policy and National Security than any other area in the Carter Administration and felt that that was the most logical area from where the leak may have occurred. He added that he had no evidence of this as this was purely speculation.

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The following are names and addresses of those individuals [REDACTED] furnished as being involved in his staff and having access to sensitive documents and Presidential briefing material:

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Interview of [REDACTED]

Page 3

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] furnished the employment address of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] as Long and Aldridge, 1800 Rhodes-Haverty  
Building, 134 Peach tree Street, Atlanta, Georgia, telephone  
number (404) 681-3000. [REDACTED] added that he could not  
furnished any further information and interview was  
terminated.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 9/16/83

On September 14, 1983, [redacted] Secretary to  
[redacted] Hoover Institute, Stanford University (SU), C.A.  
[redacted] advised that [redacted] is a Professor of  
Economics at SU and could be reached at telephone number  
[redacted]

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Investigation on 9/14/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/15/83

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/14/83

Date of transcription

Congressman Dick Cheney, State of Wyoming, was interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at his office in Washington, D.C. (WDC). Cheney was advised of the official identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview and thereafter, provided the following information: V.A.

As background, Cheney became involved in the Republican Presidential Campaign of 1980 during the July, 1980 Republican Convention and was a former White House Chief of Staff for the Ford Administration. Cheney does not personally know [ ] however, does know him to be a loyal Kennedy Democrat.

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[ ] of the Republican Policy Committee, advised Cheney that [ ] was the source of Carter campaign information passing to the Reagan campaign. Cheney could not be specific as to what information [ ] was referring to. Cheney was unsure as to the date [ ] spoke to him about [ ] however, he believes that it was after the media had printed the story regarding the 1980 debate briefing book, but before the White House had sent their letters to the Albosta Committee. Cheney was of the understanding that [ ] had spoken to [ ] prior to this press coverage. After learning of this information from [ ] Cheney advised Jim Baker, the White House Chief of Staff, who in turn advised Bill Casey. Subsequently, Casey telephoned Cheney and advised him that he did not receive any information from [ ] which had originally come from the Carter campaign. Casey did state that [ ] had furnished him a written speech for the candidate's use. Specific information regarding this speech was unknown to Cheney.

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Cheney advised that [ ] and [ ] have had a long personal, social and working relationship.

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Investigation on 9/12/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088  
by SAS [ ] Date dictated 9/14/83

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In early July, 1983, a New York Times reporter (name undisclosed) spoke to Cheney in regards to the [ ] Casey connection. Cheney concluded from talking to this reporter that [ ] was unreliable.

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Cheney was invited to the [ ] mock debate in Wexford, Virginia, in which [ ] portrayed [ ] Cheney played the part of the press and fired questions at the candidates during this mock debate. Cheney was not at all coached regarding which questions to ask and advised that he had no knowledge of any Carter briefing material present during the mock debate.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/14/83

Transcription

DC. [redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents. It was noted that [redacted] had requested the interview. [redacted] furnished the following information:

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[redacted] stated that on the evening of September 9, 1983, he received a telephone call from a nationally famous newspaper reporter. He stated he has had no prior contact with this reporter. [redacted] stated the reporter advised him that he had highly reliable evidence that [redacted] has testified, before the Albosta Committee, that [redacted] told [redacted] after the 1980 Presidential Campaign, but before the publication of the [redacted] Book, that [redacted] had Carter's "strategy memo."

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[redacted] noted that the reporter did not indicate [redacted] mentioned [redacted] by name but rather "Reagan's coach from Pennsylvania." The reporter also indicated that [redacted] testified that [redacted] had told [redacted] that he had found the Carter "strategy memo" useful. The reporter told [redacted] that [redacted] was not the source of the information but rather a "highly reliable source."

[redacted] stated he asked the reporter who [redacted] was and the reporter indicated he was a defector from the Kennedy camp.

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[redacted] stated the reporter was looking for a quote to which [redacted] responded that [redacted] was a liar.

[redacted] expressed concern to interviewing Agents that he was being "set up," possibly by the Reagan Administration. He stated that he had been directly advised by someone in the White House, who [redacted] refused to name, that the White House was displeased with [redacted] "ivory tower" position. This was a reference to Martel's statements that he advised [redacted] upon learning that the Reagan campaign had Carter debate briefing material, that the material should be returned.

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Investigation on 9/13/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088  
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/13/83

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[ ] stated he does not know [ ] and does not recall meeting [ ] in connection with the 1980 campaign. He stated he denies the allegations, as related to him by the reporter, and further stated information he has previously related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is true and correct.

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[ ] stated that he is being interviewed by the Albosta Committee this evening. He noted that in July he received a telephone call from the Albosta Committee but his calls to the Albosta Committee were not returned. He stated that approximately two weeks ago he received a call from [ ] the Chief Investigator for the Committee, which was recorded on his answering machine. He stated that [ ] in a threatening manner, advised [ ] to return the telephone calls in 24 hours. He stated when he recontacted [ ] [ ] requested that he submit to an interview during the week of September 6. [ ] indicated however, that he delayed the interview until today. He stated that on September 10, 1983, he recontacted [ ] expressed his concern that he was being targeted, and advised [ ] that he would be willing to take a polygraph for the Committee provided he would have the opportunity to approve the credentials of the polygraph examiner. He stated he would also take a polygraph for the FBI under the same circumstances.

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[ ] hesitantly identified the reporter as [ ] of the Washington Post stating he promised not to divulge [ ] name or the substance of [ ] contact to other reporters.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/14/83

Date of transcription

[redacted] telephonically contacted Special Agent [redacted] and furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated that during an interview by investigators for the Albosta Committee on September 12, 1983, he was advised that [redacted] has never made reference to [redacted] directly or indirectly to the committee.

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Investigation on 9/13/83 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 52A-18088  
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/14/83

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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maleDC.B.

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Date of transcription 9/13/83

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] who identified themselves as Special Agents with the FBI. He was told that he was being interviewed in reference to a telephone call which he had made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey concerning a White House employee who was involved in the preparation of the Carter debate briefing papers.

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[redacted] advised he formerly was with the Boeing Aircraft Company, Seattle, Washington, for twenty years. During the Reagan campaign, he worked for Reagan in the State of Washington "ringing doorbells." After the election, he quit the Boeing Aircraft Corporation and, in late January or early February, 1981, he joined the White House Staff as a Presidential Personnel Representative for all National security and foreign affairs. He explained that he was on the NASA payroll detailed to the White House Staff. He went direct from the Boeing Aircraft Corporation to the White House Staff, Washington, D.C.

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[redacted] claims as a result of his position on the White House Staff, he dealt with all of the Government agencies. William Casey, Director of the CIA, was one of his agencies. He and Casey became close friends.

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[redacted] advised he car pooled two or three days a week with a [redacted] whom he described as a Special Assistant on the White House Staff. [redacted] was a personal friend of [redacted]. On one trip, while traveling either to or from their jobs, [redacted] told him that [redacted] had said that she had typed the Carter briefing book (debate papers). She said that she had worked late and had taken the papers home to proof them at night. The next day, she had given the papers to her boss and her boss had given the papers to his boss, who then gave them directly to President Jimmy Carter.

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[redacted] advised he could not identify [redacted] boss or the person who had actually given the debate papers to President Jimmy Carter.

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Investigation on 8/31/83 at Sumner, Washington File # SE 52A-12553  
by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/1/83

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[ ] recalled that [ ] was a completely loyal, honest young lady. There never was any inference that she had retained a copy or allowed anyone else access to the debate papers. She was a nonpartisan, excellent employee, who was a superb typist. He felt that she was one person that could be completely trusted. She was in the typing pool and was recognized for her excellence and was selected to go to the Presidential Staff. He did not know exactly what her duties were prior to being selected for the Presidential Staff.

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[ ] was aware that after the election, [ ] stayed on with the Reagan staff. She was a secretary to [ ] whom he described as a Deputy Assistant to President Reagan and a member of the Presidential Personnel Office. She stayed with [ ] until he left in about February, 1981. She then went into private industry in the Washington, D.C., area.

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[ ] advised his former secretary, [ ] telephone number [ ] can make contact with [ ] is a Special Assistant on the White House Staff.

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[ ] advised he stayed on the White House Staff until July 19, 1983, when he voluntarily resigned because he felt that he was burned out and because he wanted to spend some time in the Seattle, Washington, area with his [ ]. He will return to the Boeing Aircraft Corporation where he will assume duties as a Government Affairs Manager.

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[ ] described [ ] as a married lady, about thirty-one years of age, [ ]. He has heard that she went into private industry and may possibly be with a law firm.

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[ ] advised he was connected with the Reagan Presidential Election Campaign only in that he "rang doorbells" in the State of Washington for Mr. Reagan. He claims he has no knowledge as to whether Reagan campaign activity included the operation of sources within the Carter White House or campaign and he had no knowledge concerning the Reagan campaign's possession of Carter documents, including the Carter debate briefing manual.

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X Airtel

9/22/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (52A-106049)  
FROM: SAC, WFO (52A-18088) (P) (C-3)

"FACTFIND"  
MAJOR CASE #48  
TGP  
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO airtel to Bureau, dated 9/20/83.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies each  
of the following listed FD-302's concerning captioned case:

1. [redacted] on 9/6/83.
2. [redacted] on 8/1/83.
3. [redacted] on 8/8/83.
4. [redacted] on 8/20/83.
5. [redacted] on 9/12/83.
6. Lowell Bruce Laingen on 9/13/83.
7. [redacted] on 9/7/83.
8. [redacted] on 9/14/83.
9. Congressman Dick Cheney on 9/12/83.
10. [redacted] on 9/13/83.
11. [redacted] on 9/13/83 (Reinterview).
12. [redacted] on 8/31/83.

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Investigation continuing at WFO.

③ - Bureau (Enclosures 60)  
2 - WFO (52A-18088)

[redacted]  
(5)

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CARBON COPY